SWFs as endowments

Different sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have different mandates. The largest are presumed to have a mandate similar to that of an endowment. The idea is that the state owns a large but fixed amount of a valuable commodity, usually oil, and that this oil is the property of not just the living citizens but also of all future citizens. Therefore, some of the income from today’s sale of the commodity needs to be saved for the future. So in effect the SWF is a future generation fund.

The question becomes, how much needs to be saved to make this all fair? Well, one way to define fair is that the government expenditure per citizen across all time should remain the same, adjusting for the time value of money. Another way to state this is that the purchasing power per capita remains constant. I think that most reasonable people would consider this fair. Continue reading

Analysing Abu Dhabi Investment Authority's Performance

Last year I did a bit of complex analysis, mostly trying to estimate returns, to understand Adia’s 7.5% 30 year internal rate of return (IRR) ending in 2015. This year I will make it easier. Adia’s 2016 30-year IRR was reported as 6.9%. Did Adia perform poorly in 2016?

It is difficult to tell as there are two bits of information that we need. First, recall that investment performance is usually against benchmarks. We do not know what Adia’s is, but I have used the MSCI World Index. It isn’t necessarily appropriate but given Adia’s size, which means it is a major global investor, it can be insightful. The other thing we need to remember is that the 30 years ending in 2016 starts in 1986 whilst for 2015 it started in 1985. Therefore the only difference between the two are the years 2016 and 1985.

So we can look at the difference in 2016 return relative to the 1985, i.e. if Adia had a return of +20% in 2016 but +30% in 1985 then the 30-year IRR drops even though Adia did well in 2016. This is because the IRR gains the +20% of 2016 but loses the historical +30% of 1985. In this case Adia would be penalised on their good 2016 return because they had made a much better one in 1985.

From a mathematical point of view we can’t get the actual difference between Adia’s 2016 and 1985 returns, but we can get the ratio. For Adia its 2016 return is 15% lower than its 2015 return. The MSCI WI as per MSCI’s website is 5.32% for 2016 and 36.62% for 1986 which is a decline of 23%. Adia clearly outperformed the MSCI WI in 2016 relative to 1985 by a large margin. Since we don’t have actual numbers we can’t tell if Adia underperformed the MSCI in 1986, outperformed it in 2016 or a combination of both.

What we can say is that Adia has, directionally, improved dramatically in its ability to manage its investments. A sign of the growth of our country not only in terms of population, real estate and economy but also in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.

This article was originally published in The National.

Ipic profitable in 2016

Net profit $200 million for 2016 vs loss of $4.1billion in 2015.

Details (notes 14, 17) show a big swing in cost of sales due to a drop in impairment of oil & gas properties from $3 billion in 2015 to $1 million in 2016 (I double checked the b’s and m’s).

Digging, I found that “the Group changed its accounting policy with respect to the subsequent measurement of investment properties from the cost model to fair value model.”

To get a better picture I went to cash flow from operations and it dropped $572 million in 2016. Net position appears strong, direction of business not so much. Capital intensive, long term cash conversion cycle. Challenging business.

Ipic Financials.

Article in The National.

 

GREs versus the Private Sector in the UAE

Every once in a while I decide to torture myself and rummage through the IMF’s databases looking for interesting research and analysis. When I found a Selected Issues UAE Country Report by the IMF, I thought I’d try my luck.

The report, published this month, begins by looking at government-related entities (GREs), which is anything that the government owns shares in. It is important to note that the IMF repeatedly warns that it does not have all information on all GREs. It looks at about 60 companies, although one should bear in mind that the government holdings in some are too small to have any influence.

One of the early IMF comparisons that is striking is the return on assets (ROA) of the non-financial corporate sector across GCC countries over the period from 2007 to 2014. The UAE at 8.1% a year is higher only than Kuwait. Saudi Arabia at 9.6 per cent is about a fifth higher and Oman’s 13.3% is more than three-fifths higher. How then are we the commercial hub of the GCC?

Continue reading