Board drama, and crunching the numbers on oil

A few weeks ago I pointed out that Etisalat generated earnings of Dh0.97 per share and paid out Dh0.80 per share, which is a payout ratio of 82 per cent. I further pointed out that paying out such a high percentage of profits was consistent with a status quo strategy and inconsistent with an expansion strategy, which would need to use the earnings to expand. Last week Etisalat bid for Oman’s third mobile operator license.

The question is, is it rational to pay your shareholders nearly all of your profits and then to go on to expand? Etisalat saw its revenue drop in the first quarter although it managed to grow profit by cutting expenses. Still, with revenue falling, earnings being paid out and an expansion strategy, one is walking a tight rope.


I also recently analysed the 2016 financial performance of Gulf Finance House (GFH), a financial services group, in particular with respect to announced discussions with Shuaa Capital for a merger. The analysis showed a large loss from normal operations of about US$230 million masked by a one-time litigation award to show a profit. I was curious to see why Shuaa would be interested in GFH and so reviewed GFH’s Q1 2017 financials that were recently released. Perhaps GFH could engineer a miraculous turn around in normal operations.

The report showed that GFH has indeed achieved a profit of $33.5m for the quarter. An astounding achievement. I dug deeper. Financial services can have notoriously volatile earnings but one thing caught my eye: a profit of $25.6m from the sale of a subsidiary.

Upon closer examination, the profit came from selling a stake in a school.

The shares were received as part of the litigation settlement in 2016 and GFH valued this part of the stake at $29.4m. A year, or less, later they sold the stake for $55m for a profit of $25.6m. That is a return on investment of 87 per cent in at most one year. Did GFH generate a fantastic 87 per cent return in one year by its skill in operating the school?

Perhaps the whole market went up 87 per cent? Possibly the buyer and their advisers are clueless and overpaid by nearly double?

This one-off extraordinary transaction explains 76 per cent of the profit. I considered analysing if the other 24 per cent was one-off or normal recurring business, but why bother?


Union Properties last week announced that three of the directors of the board had resigned right after an AGM that appointed them. The three directors publicly denied resigning. There could be some chance that this is just a big misunderstanding. The more likely scenarios are less than salubrious.

Board drama is a red flag suggesting serious internal issues at a company. The number of such incidents in the market, along with going concern warning, capital injections at loss making companies, and law suits, will be a gauge of how much the oil price drop from 2014 is affecting our economy.


On Thursday, the price of oil dropped to its lowest level in five months. The main benchmark Brent fell below US$50 a barrel, followed by a modest comeback on Friday to about $49; as of Monday afternoon it was still at that level.

One reason for the drop was reported in a Financial Times article that quoted Jamie Webster, a fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University: “Opec extension is baked into market expectations, but roaring shale growth makes the sizeable but too small a cut completely lose its potency.” A separate FT article stated that although the agreed Opec production cuts amount to 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd) the actual cut to exports might be as little as 800,000 bpd.

It is a little worrisome that Opec cuts production and oil prices pop up for only a short while. We keep hearing how oil prices will go up because of a lack of investment in oil infrastructure. Oil prices might pop up, but they keep dropping back down. If what you are hearing is different than what you are seeing, which should you believe?

In the investment world we have a phrase, “talking one’s book”. This describes the natural human trait of speaking positively about something beneficial to you, in this case the investments an investor has made. As investors and individuals who must make a myriad decisions based on the economy we should ask ourselves: if doing the same thing but expecting different results is a sign of insanity, then what is listening to the same thing and expecting different results a sign of?

This article was originally published in The National.

Trust but verify: a deeper dive into the UAE’s latest business news

Etisalat’s preliminary 2016 financial statements are available at the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange. Earnings per share for 2016 operations? Dh0.97. Proposed dividends per share? Dh0.80. This gives a payout ratio of 82 per cent. Rationally, your payout ratio is high when you do not believe that there are any opportunities to invest in and so return cash generated to the shareholders.

Etisalat’s dividend policy would suggest that it does not see growth opportunities and therefore expects to simply be a yield play. This refers to business operations and not market price movements. Whether Etisalat is being rational in expecting the economy to stagnate, or worse, and is therefore taking a defensive cash position, or on the other hand is in denial and simply continuing to pay a historical dividend even though the payout ratio is high will be revealed by its stated strategy that it presents at the shareholders’ meeting.

If the strategy is defensive, closing certain operations or at least remaining steady, then the stated strategy will be consistent with the dividend strategy. If, on the other hand, Etisalat presents a transformation strategy or even an expansionary strategy, then this will be inconsistent with its dividend policy.

The suspense is unbearable.

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Venture capital as a substitute for oil in driving economic growth

Venture capital is critical to the future success of not only the UAE but also the GCC. To understand this we first need to understand the historic formula for our success – oil leads to financial capital, which leads to real estate development, which creates social and business communities that attract people. Repeat.

Even if oil prices had not collapsed, sooner or later the size of the economy would reach a level at which oil alone could not deliver growth. We have not reached a point of reckoning because oil prices halved, that only accelerated the inevitable.

The conventional argument is that SMEs are the engine for growth in any economy. Some might argue that the global conglomerates coupled with global trade are the engines for growth. Whatever idea you subscribe to, in the end one has to accept that whether you believe SMEs drive economic growth or whether it is large companies, the first step is starting that company. Put simply, without start-ups an economy cannot normally achieve sustainable growth.

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Oil, Opec, Economic Reform and Venture Capital

Last week the Minister of Energy for the UAE was reported in an article as saying that it is too soon to extend the oil supply deal, and then shortly afterwards there was a report that Saudi Arabia’s minister of energy had said the deal could be extended after the first six months. I am known to be pessimistic about Opec cooperation, but given the close relationship enjoyed by Saudi and the Emirates, I thought about the perceived discord in communication and was led to an intriguing idea.

As described in an article in The National on Monday, Norway is facing challenges in diversifying away from oil. If Norway, with its more developed economy, is facing challenges then clearly diversification for a less developed oil-exporting country must be even more challenging. This would lead to the idea that differing challenges faced by each country could lead to different strategies and signalling of these strategies with regards to oil production.

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Oil, Opec and the Revenge of Rosneft's Sechin

Wednesday, November 24, 2014: Ali Al Naimi, the former Saudi oil minister, signals that Saudi Arabia was changing its oil production strategy from oligopolist – as the main swing producer that keeps oil prices high – to capitalist, and would go for market share. This would lead to lower crude oil prices. The Venezuelan foreign minister, Rafael Ramirez, replied that the prices at the time of about US$62 per barrel would not allow for the necessary investment in oil production capability and would lead to a massive price surge when oil demand increased in the future and that there wasn’t enough spare capacity to meet that demand.

This has been an oft quoted warning by many others over the years.

May, 2015: the Rosneft chief executive and close Putin adviser Igor Sechin states that Opec is dead. Rosneft is Russia’s main state-owned oil company. Opec being “dead” means that Mr Sechin does not believe that oil prices can be managed. Keep this in mind – the most powerful man in Russian oil said a little over a year ago that oil prices cannot be managed.

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Oil: A Tale of Obfuscation

With the recent Opec meeting we have once again been bombarded by a lot of analysis, often misguided and incorrect, both in the lead-up to the actual meeting and then after it is over. The main culprit is the phrase “cost of oil [production]”.

Let us try to understand this so we can sift through the hype and see if there are any nuggets of wisdom to be found. Our first tool is understanding the difference between average cost and marginal cost.

Let us consider as an example a company like Microsoft that develops and sells software. Whenever Microsoft develops a new version of its Windows operating system, it costs money to pay for the software developers, the buildings they work in, the computers they use and all the support staff, such as finance and HR.

Let us assume it takes US$100 million to develop the new OS. This is usually called the fixed cost or capital expenditure.

If Microsoft ends up selling 1 million copies of this software, then one might think, as a first calculation, that the average cost of the software is $100 per copy and that it should not bother selling if the price is lower.

The problem here is that the actual cost of producing a copy of the new OS for sale, which is usually delivered online, is negligible once it has been developed.

This is called the marginal, or variable, cost.

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Foreign investment could make low-oil belt tightening easier to bear

In this article I will outline the important financial themes that I see for the GCC for this year. It starts with oil, which is at about US$38 per barrel. Estimates for the break-even price for shale oil production vary, but the consensus appears to be at least $60.

Examining these two pieces of information, it becomes hard to understand the crowd who believe that Saudi Arabia is trying to crush shale oil. The oil price is about $19 below where it needs to be to achieve this objective. For Saudi Arabia, which pumps 10 million barrels of oil per day, that is about $200m a day of unnecessary loss in this scenario, or an unnecessary loss of $73 billion a year.

One could argue that going this low, is the kingdom being safe? Surely there is some middle ground that would starve shale and inflict less pain on the kingdom? Oil at $38 a barrel is overkill.

I think that it is arrogant to assume that the Saudis do not know what they are doing, especially with oil. It seems clear that shale oil is not the target, or at least not the main one.

That leaves only one other credible target, and that is Iran, Saudi Arabia’s main adversary in the region. The timing, which comes with the US president Barack Obama’s push on the Iran nuclear issues that allowed sanctions to be lifted against Iran, is telling.

Iran’s pleas to big oil companies to develop its infrastructure so it can increase its capacity above its current 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) have fallen on deaf ears. Why? Because it is uneconomical to invest in oilfields today after the glut of investments over the years when oil was $100 per barrel.

Critics also say Saudi Arabia cannot survive oil this low for more than three years. The country’s budget deficit is about $100bn to $150bn a year. Saudi Arabia has about $500bn in foreign reserves today. If that is all the maths that you are willing to do, then yes there are four to five years left. But anyone who thinks in this way simply does not understand Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom can and has previously borrowed large amounts locally. It can easily borrow enough to finance the current deficit for at least three years, if not five. It did exactly that in the 1980s and 1990s. This means that Saudi Arabia can withstand current oil prices for seven to 10 years to counter its adversary Iran. It is likely we will see a longer period of low oil prices.

But this takes a lot of belt tightening across the GCC. There are two main countermeasures that have been proposed and enacted – taxes and a smaller government budgets. The usual response to an increase in taxes is flight of capital, especially as a low oil price means most of the rest of the world will grow. This is the opposite of what the region needs. Shrinking budgets automatically lead to shrinking economies.

To actually complete and complement the above two actions, the GCC needs to make itself attractive to foreign capital. This begins with developing the rule of law and applying it in a consistent manner. Special exemptions, say for an IPO, need to stop. The regulation should be either applied equally or scrapped.

The next step to level the playing field is to continue to improve corporate governance. It can be appealing in times of stress to ignore the tenets of corporate governance in the name of speed or priority, but the cost will be the continued flight of capital.

The third step is liberalisation. Think if in the past 30 years all expatriates were allowed to invest freely in the UAE. Our economy would be much bigger, and as a result much healthier. In the UAE we have taken some steps in allowing ownerships of some listed shares and we have created free zones. But 100 per cent ownership of companies on federal land still does not exist. Saudi Arabia allows 100 per cent foreign ownership in most sectors. If we want to attract money, let’s give foreigners the ability to invest.

The final step is a subset of corporate governance – transparency. When things are going well, transparency is in full swing. But when there is a problem, everything becomes opaque. Corporations need to be open and honest in good times, and especially in bad ones. Anything less will lose investor confidence

Fiscal policy alone – shrinking budgets and raising taxes – will not lead to balanced budgets but will destroy the economy. Fixing the legal and governance structure of the economy might just be what the doctor ordered.

This article was originally published in The National.

Shale Oil Producers: Swing Producers or Price Takers?

The new narrative in the oil markets is that shale oil producers have usurped the Saudis as the swing producers. What a dangerously naïve idea.

A swing producer is one that intentionally changes its production levels to achieve its objectives. If oil prices drop and Saudi Arabia decides to reduce production so as to stabilise oil prices then that is the action of a swing producer. In other words, a swing producer can intentionally move prices.

A price taker is a producer that sells oil at whatever price it is given. It has no market pricing power. If oil prices drop and shale oil producers are forced to stop production because they are registering massive losses then they are price takers.

Just because shale oil producers become profitable at USD 100 and come online at that price does not mean that they are swing producers. As in any other market massively high costs means that you are at the bottom of the food chain. Costs that are 30 to 50 times that of the largest oil exporter in the world indicate that shale oil producers are not only at the bottom of the oil production food chain, they might very well be buried deep underground.

Saudi Arabia remains, by a large margin, the most important producer of oil globally.

Second Order Questions and Sterilising the Oil Price Effect

Consider, if you will, an oil exporting nation. Consider further those nations whose commodity exports far exceed their budgetary needs. What is a nation to do with such excess wealth?

There are two main approaches to this. The first is the more conventional strategy inherited from central banks, in many ways the precursors to SWFs. This method, which I will call risk-off, seeks simply to hold foreign exchange reserves, usually the US dollar, in the form of high quality, low risk assets, usually US Treasury bonds.

The second strategy, which I will call the risk-on, borrows heavily from pension and endowment funds. Investments are made not to protect value, but to create value so as to meet future obligations. Not only is public equity as an asset class targeted, but all manner of alternative investments including but not restricted to private equity, hedge funds, real estate and high yield debt.

So as not to confuse the point that I am trying to make, I would like to clarify that there is no right or wrong to which method a government chooses, as the choice is driven by policy considerations not investment considerations.

Back to our story. If an oil exporting country with a risk-on strategy suddenly faced oil prices dropping by 50%, what is the net effect to its revenue? Using Norway as an example, their circa 1.7 million barrels per day of export would lose USD 85 million per day in revenue or USD 31 billion per year.

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Saudi Oil: Through the Looking Glass & Other Adventures in Investing

About a month and a half ago I wrote an article on the sudden drop in oil prices, pointing out some basic errors in the media analysis and providing alternative interpretations for what was going on. The media flurry continued, and the errors in reporting and analysis also continued. So I wrote a second article diving in deeper into the analysis. The media storm continues unabated. To understand the insanity, Reuters on 17 November reported that hedge funds where net short oil. On 8 December Reuters announced that hedge funds were net long oil. What gives? Continue reading