For years, U.S. companies sought to hedge their supply chain exposure to China by pursuing a “China+1” strategy: diversifying production into countries like India, Mexico, and Canada. The logic was simple: if tariffs or politics made China risky, alternative partners could provide stability. But recent policy shifts show that diversification is no guarantee of safety. When tariffs follow firms from one geography to the next, the entire premise of supply chain resilience is called into question.
India: From Partner to Target
India has been positioned as the great beneficiary of China’s tariff troubles. U.S. imports from India doubled over the past decade with pharmaceuticals, communications equipment, and apparel leading the surge. The doubling of U.S. tariffs on Indian goods to 50% shows how quickly a diversification partner can become a target.
The official rationale was geopolitical: India’s continued purchase of Russian oil. The economic reality is that U.S. firms who moved production to India now face the same higher costs they sought to escape. Consumers pay more. Exporters face retaliation. Supply chain resilience turns into renewed vulnerability.
Complicating matters further, this week Xi Jinping rolled out the red carpet for both Vladimir Putin and Narendra Modi in Beijing. The summit was framed as a coordinated response to Trump’s tariff and foreign policy shocks. The symbolism was striking: India, once seen as the natural counterbalance to China in supply chain diversification, is now engaging more closely with Beijing.
If India and China find common cause in resisting U.S. tariffs, even while remaining rivals in other areas, the logic of “China+1” weakens. What was meant to be a hedge against Chinese political risk may no longer offer independence. Instead, diversification to India risks becoming exposure to a broader bloc of countries aligned against U.S. economic leverage. Continue reading
